India's Suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT): A Strategic Masterstroke for a wider Implications and Regional Ramifications

India had been contemplating the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty for several years. However, the recent ghastly attack in Pahalgam and the surge of public sentiment demanding action against Pakistan compelled India to unilaterally suspend the 65-year-old treaty, which had been mediated by the World Bank. Ideally, this step could have been taken back in the 1990s, but India, on humanitarian grounds, refrained from scrapping the agreement which is the lifeline of Pakistan agriculture.

In recent years, however, China’s construction of massive reservoirs and hydropower projects on the Brahmaputra River—which may eventually reduce its downstream flow into India—has been a major factor prompting India to consider similar measures with Pakistan. Notably, the Indus River originates in Tibet (China), with India being the first downstream nation.

The Indus water system comprises six rivers: the eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi—were allocated entirely to India, while the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—were apportioned with approximately 80% (about 99 billion cubic meters) of their waters going to Pakistan and 20% (around 41 million cubic meters) to India. By suspending the treaty, India has executed a strategic move that is arguably more impactful than conventional warfare and will likely cause significant long-term disruption in Pakistan and a public outcry.

However, it's important to note that there is no provision for unilateral suspension in the treaty, which includes a clear arbitration mechanism for disputes. Yet, extraordinary circumstances sometimes demand extraordinary decisions. This move aims to pressure Pakistan into curbing terrorism emanating from its territory—or face the consequences.

Furthermore, if international arbitration arises in the future, India could assert claims over the Brahmaputra and push for a comprehensive regional water-sharing agreement. This could mark the beginning of what many have feared—a global conflict cantered around water.

In the immediate future (1–2 years), the impact may be limited, as India’s current run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects require minimal water storage. India has not even been able to fully utilize its 20% share. However, with plans to build new dams, storage reservoirs, canal systems, and hydroelectric plants over the next 3–5 years, the effect will intensify. These rivers collectively carry tens of billions of cubic meters of water, and managing this volume—especially during flood season is difficult but managing during dry /lean season will become crucial. While flood-season flows can't be entirely withheld, dry-season flows can be stored and redirected, causing substantial stress for Pakistan.

Additionally, India will no longer be obliged to share vital data on rainfall, catchment areas, seasonal flows, and minimum flow levels during lean seasons—information that was crucial for Pakistan’s water planning.

In response, Pakistan has declared this move as an act of war and suspended the 1972 Shimla Agreement, which governs the Line of Control (LoC). India can leverage this opportunity to raise its claim over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). Pakistan’s underlying motive in suspending the Shimla Agreement appears to be opening the door to international intervention—something India has consistently resisted under the bilateral framework of Shimla accord. The coming months will reveal how India capitalizes on both these developments—controlling water, the lifeline of Pakistan, and addressing the LoC issue without the burden of historical agreements.

Pakistan is heavily dependent on these rivers for irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water across key cities such as Lahore, Karachi, and Multan. Around 80% of the country’s agriculture—covering roughly 16 million hectares—is fed by these rivers. Key crops such as rice, wheat, cotton, and sugarcane are water-intensive, and nearly one-third of Pakistan’s hydropower relies on these waters.

Over the next few years, a reduced flow will inevitably impact agricultural yields, raise costs, and strain the economy. Approximately 61% of Pakistan’s population resides in the Indus basin, and 25% of its GDP is directly linked to these waters. Already a water-scarce nation, any further reduction will exacerbate vulnerabilities and cause energy shortages, particularly impacting the Tarbela and Mangla hydropower projects.

Now, it’s up to India to decide how swiftly and effectively it can turn this opportunity into long-term strategic advantage.